The Secrets of Forex Trading, Money and The Federal Reserve

Tennessee militia colonel David Crockett, perhaps best known for his role in the 1836 defense of the Alamo, also served three terms in the United States Congress between 1827 and 1835. Nationally known during his lifetime as a political representative of the frontier, Crockett apparently came by that reputation honestly, inasmuch as he was not above listening to his constituents. The following excerpt from an 1884 biography by Edward Sylvester Ellis, The Life of Colonel David Crockett, if accurate, might reveal how his own rural electorate taught him the importance of adhering to the Constitution and the perils of ignoring its restrictions.

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Crockett was then the lion of Washington. I was a great admirer of his character, and, having several friends who were intimate with him, I found no difficulty in making his acquaintance. I was fascinated with him, and he seemed to take a fancy to me.

I was one day in the lobby of the House of Representatives when a bill was taken up appropriating money for the benefit of a widow of a distinguished naval officer. Several beautiful speeches had been made in its support, rather, as I thought, because it afforded the speakers a fine opportunity for display than from the necessity of convincing anybody, for it seemed to me that everybody favored it. The Speaker was just about to put the question when Crockett arose. Everybody expected, of course, that he was going to make one of his characteristic speeches in support of the bill. He commenced:

“Mr. Speaker — I have as much respect for the memory of the deceased, and as much sympathy for the sufferings of the living, if suffering there be, as any man in this House, but we must not permit our respect for the dead or our sympathy for a part of the living to lead us into an act of injustice to the balance of the living. I will not go into an argument to prove that Congress has no power to appropriate this money as an act of charity. Every member upon this floor knows it. We have the right, as individuals, to give away as much of our own money as we please in charity; but as members of Congress we have no right so to appropriate a dollar of the public money. Some eloquent appeals have been made to us upon the ground that it is a debt due the deceased. Mr. Speaker, the deceased lived long after the close of the war; he was in office to the day of his death, and I have never heard that the government was in arrears to him. This government can owe no debts but for services rendered, and at a stipulated price. If it is a debt, how much is it? Has it been audited, and the amount due ascertained? If it is a debt, this is not the place to present it for payment, or to have its merits examined. If it is a debt, we owe more than we can ever hope to pay, for we owe the widow of every soldier who fought in the War of 1812 precisely the same amount. There is a woman in my neighborhood, the widow of as gallant a man as ever shouldered a musket. He fell in battle. She is as good in every respect as this lady, and is as poor. She is earning her daily bread by her daily labor; but if I were to introduce a bill to appropriate five or ten thousand dollars for her benefit, I should be laughed at, and my bill would not get five votes in this House. There are thousands of widows in the country just such as the one I have spoken of, but we never hear of any of these large debts to them. Sir, this is no debt. The government did not owe it to the deceased when he was alive; it could not contract it after he died. I do not wish to be rude, but I must be plain. Every man in this House knows it is not a debt. We cannot, without the grossest corruption, appropriate this money as the payment of a debt. We have not the semblance of authority to appropriate it as a charity. Mr. Speaker, I have said we have the right to give as much of our own money as we please. I am the poorest man on this floor. I cannot vote for this bill, but I will give one week’s pay to the object, and if every member of Congress will do the same, it will amount to more than the bill asks.”

He took his seat. Nobody replied. The bill was put upon its passage, and, instead of passing unanimously, as was generally supposed, and as, no doubt, it would, but for that speech, it received but few votes, and, of course, was lost.

Like many other young men, and old ones too, for that matter, who had not thought upon the subject, I desired the passage of the bill, and felt outraged at its defeat. I determined that I would persuade my friend Crockett to move a reconsideration the next day.

Previous engagements preventing me from seeing Crockett that night, I went early to his room the next morning and found him engaged in addressing and franking letters, a large pile of which lay upon his table.

I broke in upon him rather abruptly, by asking him what devil had possessed him to make that speech and defeat that bill yesterday. Without turning his head or looking up from his work, he replied:

“You see that I am very busy now; take a seat and cool yourself. I will be through in a few minutes, and then I will tell you all about it.”

He continued his employment for about ten minutes, and when he had finished he turned to me and said:

“Now, sir, I will answer your question. But thereby hangs a tale, and one of considerable length, to which you will have to listen.”

I listened, and this is the tale which I heard:

“Several years ago I was one evening standing on the steps of the Capitol with some other members of Congress, when our attention was attracted by a great light over in Georgetown. It was evidently a large fire. We jumped into a hack and drove over as fast as we could. When we got there, I went to work, and I never worked as hard in my life as I did there for several hours. But, in spite of all that could be done, many houses were burned and many families made houseless, and, besides, some of them had lost all but the clothes they had on. The weather was very cold, and when I saw so many women and children suffering, I felt that something ought to be done for them, and everybody else seemed to feel the same way.

“The next morning a bill was introduced appropriating $20,000 for their relief. We put aside all other business and rushed it through as soon as it could be done. I said everybody felt as I did. That was not quite so; for, though they perhaps sympathized as deeply with the sufferers as I did, there were a few of the members who did not think we had the right to indulge our sympathy or excite our charity at the expense of anybody but ourselves. They opposed the bill, and upon its passage demanded the yeas and nays. There were not enough of them to sustain the call, but many of us wanted our names to appear in favor of what we considered a praiseworthy measure, and we voted with them to sustain it. So the yeas and nays were recorded, and my name appeared on the journals in favor of the bill.

“The next summer, when it began to be time to think about the election, I concluded I would take a scout around among the boys of my district. I had no opposition there, but, as the election was some time off, I did not know what might turn up, and I thought it was best to let the boys know that I had not forgot them, and that going to Congress had not made me too proud to go to see them.

“So I put a couple of shirts and a few twists of tobacco into my saddlebags, and put out. I had been out about a week and had found things going very smoothly, when, riding one day in a part of my district in which I was more of a stranger than any other, I saw a man in a field plowing and coming toward the road. I gauged my gait so that we should meet as he came to the fence. As he came up I spoke to the man. He replied politely, but, as I thought, rather coldly, and was about turning his horse for another furrow when I said to him: ‘Don’t be in such a hurry, my friend; I want to have a little talk with you, and get better acquainted.’ He replied:

“‘I am very busy, and have but little time to talk, but if it does not take too long, I will listen to what you have to say.’

“I began: ‘Well, friend, I am one of those unfortunate beings called candidates, and –’

“‘Yes, I know you; you are Colonel Crockett. I have seen you once before, and voted for you the last time you were elected. I suppose you are out electioneering now, but you had better not waste your time or mine. I shall not vote for you again.’

“This was a sockdolager [a knock down blow -ed.] …. I begged him to tell me what was the matter.

“‘Well, Colonel, it is hardly worthwhile to waste time or words upon it. I do not see how it can be mended, but you gave a vote last winter which shows that either you have not capacity to understand the Constitution, or that you are wanting in the honesty and firmness to be guided by it. In either case you are not the man to represent me. But I beg your pardon for expressing it in that way. I did not intend to avail myself of the privilege of the constituent to speak plainly to a candidate for the purpose of insulting or wounding you. I intend by it only to say that your understanding of the Constitution is very different from mine; and I will say to you what, but for my rudeness, I should not have said, that I believe you to be honest …. But an understanding of the Constitution different from mine I cannot overlook, because the Constitution, to be worth anything, must be held sacred, and rigidly observed in all its provisions. The man who wields power and misinterprets it is the more dangerous the more honest he is.’

“‘I admit the truth of all you say, but there must be some mistake about it, for I do not remember that I gave any vote last winter upon any constitutional question.’

“‘No, Colonel, there’s no mistake. Though I live here in the backwoods and seldom go from home, I take the papers from Washington and read very carefully all the proceedings of Congress. My papers say that last winter you voted for a bill to appropriate $20,000 to some sufferers by a fire in Georgetown. Is that true?’

“‘Certainly it is, and I thought that was the last vote which anybody in the world would have found fault with.’

“‘Well, Colonel, where do you find in the Constitution any authority to give away the public money in charity?’

“Here was another sockdolager; for, when I began to think about it, I could not remember a thing in the Constitution that authorized it. I found I must take another tack, so I said:

“‘Well, my friend; I may as well own up. You have got me there. But certainly nobody will complain that a great and rich country like ours should give the insignificant sum of $20,000 to relieve its suffering women and children, particularly with a full and overflowing Treasury, and I am sure, if you had been there, you would have done just as I did.’

“‘It is not the amount, Colonel, that I complain of; it is the principle. In the first place, the government ought to have in the Treasury no more than enough for its legitimate purposes. But that has nothing to do with the question. The power of collecting and disbursing money at pleasure is the most dangerous power that can be entrusted to man, particularly under our system of collecting revenue by a tariff, which reaches every man in the country, no matter how poor he may be, and the poorer he is the more he pays in proportion to his means. What is worse, it presses upon him without his knowledge where the weight centers, for there is not a man in the United States who can ever guess how much he pays to the government. So you see, that while you are contributing to relieve one, you are drawing it from thousands who are even worse off than he. If you had the right to give anything, the amount was simply a matter of discretion with you, and you had as much right to give $20,000,000 as $20,000. If you have the right to give to one, you have the right to give to all; and, as the Constitution neither defines charity nor stipulates the amount, you are at liberty to give to any and everything which you may believe, or profess to believe, is a charity, and to any amount you may think proper. You will very easily perceive what a wide door this would open for fraud and corruption and favoritism, on the one hand, and for robbing the people on the other. No, Colonel, Congress has no right to give charity. Individual members may give as much of their own money as they please, but they have no right to touch a dollar of the public money for that purpose. If twice as many houses had been burned in this county as in Georgetown, neither you nor any other member of Congress would have thought of appropriating a dollar for our relief. There are about two hundred and forty members of Congress. If they had shown their sympathy for the sufferers by contributing each one week’s pay, it would have made over $13,000. There are plenty of wealthy men in and around Washington who could have given $20,000 without depriving themselves of even a luxury of life. The congressmen chose to keep their own money, which, if reports be true, some of them spend not very creditably; and the people about Washington, no doubt, applauded you for relieving them from the necessity of giving by giving what was not yours to give. The people have delegated to Congress, by the Constitution, the power to do certain things. To do these, it is authorized to collect and pay moneys, and for nothing else. Everything beyond this is usurpation, and a violation of the Constitution.’”

“I have given you,” continued Crockett, “an imperfect account of what he said. Long before he was through, I was convinced that I had done wrong.

He wound up by saying:

“‘So you see, Colonel, you have violated the Constitution in what I consider a vital point. It is a precedent fraught with danger to the country, for when Congress once begins to stretch its power beyond the limits of the Constitution, there is no limit to it, and no security for the people. I have no doubt you acted honestly, but that does not make it any better, except as far as you are personally concerned, and you see that I cannot vote for you.’

“I tell you I felt streaked. I saw if I should have opposition, and this man should go to talking, he would set others to talking, and in that district I was a gone fawn-skin. I could not answer him, and the fact is, I was so fully convinced that he was right, I did not want to. But I must satisfy him, and I said to him:

“‘Well, my friend, you hit the nail upon the head when you said I had not sense enough to understand the Constitution. I intended to be guided by it, and thought I had studied it fully. I have heard many speeches in Congress about the powers of Congress, but what you have said here at your plow has got more hard, sound sense in it than all the fine speeches I ever heard. If I had ever taken the view of it that you have, I would have put my head into the fire before I would have given that vote; and if you will forgive me and vote for me again, if I ever vote for another unconstitutional law I wish I may be shot.’

“He laughingly replied: ‘Yes, Colonel, you have sworn to that once before, but I will trust you again upon one condition. You say that you are convinced that your vote was wrong. Your acknowledgment of it will do more good than beating you for it. If, as you go around the district, you will tell people about this vote, and that you are satisfied it was wrong, I will not only vote for you, but will do what I can to keep down opposition, and, perhaps, I may exert some little influence in that way.’

“‘If I don’t,’ said I, ‘I wish I may be shot; and to convince you that I am in earnest in what I say I will come back this way in a week or ten days, and if you will get up a gathering of the people, I will make a speech to them, Get up a barbecue, and I will pay for it.’

“‘No, Colonel, we are not rich people in this section, but we have plenty of provisions to contribute for a barbecue, and some to spare for those who have none. The push of crops will be over in a few days, and we can then afford a day for a barbecue. This is Thursday; I will see to getting it up on Saturday week. Come to my house on Friday, and we will go together, and I promise you a very respectable crowd to see and hear you.’

“‘Well, I will be here. But one thing more before I say good-by. I must know your name.’

“‘My name is Bunce.’

“‘Not Horatio Bunce?’

“‘Yes.’

“‘Well, Mr. Bunce, I never saw you before, though you say you have seen me, but I know you very well. I am glad I have met you, and very proud that I may hope to have you for my friend. You must let me shake your hand before I go.’

“We shook hands and parted.

“It was one of the luckiest hits of my life that I met him. He mingled but little with the public, but was widely known for his remarkable intelligence and incorruptible integrity, and for a heart brimful and running over with kindness and benevolence, which showed themselves not only in words but in acts. He was the oracle of the whole country around him, and his fame had extended far beyond the circle of his immediate acquaintance. Though I had never met him before, I had heard much of him, and but for this meeting it is very likely I should have had opposition, and had been beaten. One thing is very certain, no man could now stand up in that district under such a vote.

“At the appointed time I was at his house, having told our conversation to every crowd I had met, and to every man I stayed all night with, and I found that it gave the people an interest and a confidence in me stronger than I had ever seen manifested before.

“Though I was considerably fatigued when I reached his house, and, under ordinary circumstances, should have gone early to bed, I kept him up until midnight, talking about the principles and affairs of government, and got more real, true knowledge of them than I had got all my life before.

“I have told you Mr. Bunce converted me politically. He came nearer converting me religiously than I had ever been before. He did not make a very good Christian of me, as you know; but he has wrought upon my mind a conviction of the truth of Christianity, and upon my feelings a reverence for its purifying and elevating power such as I had never felt before.

“I have known and seen much of him since, for I respect him — no, that is not the word — I reverence and love him more than any living man, and I go to see him two or three times every year; and I will tell you, sir, if every one who professes to be a Christian lived and acted and enjoyed it as he does, the religion of Christ would take the word by storm.

“But to return to my story. The next morning we went to the barbecue, and, to my surprise, found about a thousand men there. I met a good many whom I had not known before, and they and my friend introduced me around until I had got pretty well acquainted — at least, they all knew me.

“In due time notice was given that I would speak to them. They gathered up around a stand that had been erected. I opened my speech by saying:

“‘Fellow-citizens — I present myself before you today feeling like a new man. My eyes have lately been opened to truths which ignorance or prejudice, or both, had heretofore hidden from my view. I feel that I can today offer you the ability to render you more valuable service than I have ever been able to render before. I am here today more for the purpose of acknowledging my error than to seek your votes. That I should make this acknowledgment is due to myself as well as to you. Whether you will vote for me is a matter for your consideration only.’

“I went on to tell them about the fire and my vote for the appropriation as I have told it to you, and then told them why I was satisfied it was wrong. I closed by saying:

“‘And now, fellow-citizens, it remains only for me to tell you that the most of the speech you have listened to with so much interest was simply a repetition of the arguments by which your neighbor, Mr. Bunce, convinced me of my error.

“‘It is the best speech I ever made in my life, but he is entitled to the credit of it. And now I hope he is satisfied with his convert and that he will get up here and tell you so.’

“He came upon the stand and said:

“‘Fellow-citizens — It affords me great pleasure to comply with the request of Colonel Crockett. I have always considered him a thoroughly honest man, and I am satisfied that he will faithfully perform all that he has promised you today.’

“He went down, and there went up from that crowd such a shout for Davy Crockett as his name never called forth before.

“I am not much given to tears, but I was taken with a choking then and felt some big drops rolling down my cheeks. And I tell you now that the remembrance of those few words spoken by such a man, and the honest, hearty shout they produced, is worth more to me than all the honors I have received and all the reputation I have ever made, or ever shall make, as a member of Congress.

“Now, sir,” concluded Crockett, “you know why I made that speech yesterday. I have had several thousand copies of it printed, and was directing them to my constituents when you came in.

“There is one thing now to which I will call your attention. You remember that I proposed to give a week’s pay. There are in that House many very wealthy men — men who think nothing of spending a week’s pay, or a dozen of them, for a dinner or a wine party when they have something to accomplish by it. Some of those same men made beautiful speeches upon the great debt of gratitude which the country owed the deceased — a debt which could not be paid by money — and the insignificance and worthlessness of money, particularly so insignificant a sum as $10,000, when weighed against the honor of the nation. Yet not one of them responded to my proposition. Money with them is nothing but trash when it is to come out of the people. But it is the one great thing for which most of them are striving, and many of them sacrifice honor, integrity, and justice to obtain it.”

Think on it…

The forex market, unlike other exchange driven markets, has a unique feature that many market makers use to entice traders to trade. They promise no exchange fees or regulatory fees, no data fees and, best of all, no commissions. To the new trader just wanting to break into the trading business, this sounds too good to be true. Trading without transaction costs is clearly an advantage. However, what might sound like a bargain to inexperienced traders may not be the best deal available - or even a deal at all. Here we’ll show you how to evaluate forex broker fee/commission structures and find the one that will work best for you.

Commission Structures

There are three forms of commission used by brokers in forex. Some firms offer a fixed spread, others offer a variable spread and still others charge a commission based on a percentage of the spread. So which is the best choice? At first glance, it seems that the fixed spread may be the right choice, because then you would know exactly what to expect. However, before you jump in and choose one, there are a few things you need to consider.

The spread is the difference between the price the market maker is prepared to pay you for buying the currency (the bid price), versus the price at which he is prepared to sell you the currency (the ask price). Suppose you see the following quotes on your screen: “EURUSD - 1.4952 - 1.4955.” This represents a spread of three pips, the difference between the bid price of 1.4952 and the ask price of 1.4955. If you are dealing with a market maker who is offering a fixed spread of three pips instead of a variable spread, the difference will always be three pips, regardless of market volatility.

In the case of a broker who offers a variable spread, you can expect a spread that will, at times, be as low as 1.5 pips or as high as five pips, depending on the currency pair being traded and the level of market volatility.

Some brokers may also charge a very small commission, perhaps two-tenths of one pip, and then will pass the order flow received from you on to a large market maker with whom he or she has a relationship. In such an arrangement, you can receive a very tight spread that only larger traders could otherwise access.

Different Brokers, Different Levels of Service

So what is the bottom line effect of each type of commission on your trading? Given that all brokers are not created equal, this is a difficult question to answer. The reason is that there are other factors to take into account when weighing what is most advantageous for your trading account.

For example, not all brokers are able to make a market equally. The forex market is an over-the-counter market, which means that banks, the primary market makers, have relationships with other banks and price aggregators (retail online brokers), based on the capitalization and creditworthiness of each organization. There are no guarantors or exchanges involved, just the credit agreement between each player. So, when it comes to an online market maker, for example, your broker’s effectiveness will depend on his or her relationship with banks, and how much volume the broker does with them. Usually, the higher-volume forex players are quoted tighter spreads.

If your market maker has a strong relationship with a line of banks and can aggregate, say, twelve banks’ price quotes, then the brokerage firm will be able to pass the average bid and ask on to its retail customers. Even after slightly widening the spread to account for profit, the dealer will be able to pass a more competitive spread on to you than competitors that are not well capitalized.

If you are dealing with a broker that can offer guaranteed liquidity at attractive spreads, this may be what you should look for. On the other hand, you might want to pay a fixed pip spread if you know you are getting at-the-money executions every time you trade. Slippage, which occurs when your trade is executed away from the price you were offered, is a cost that you do not want to bear.

In the case of a commission broker, whether you should pay a small commission depends on what else the broker is offering. For example, suppose your broker charges you a small commission, usually in the order of two-tenths of one pip, or about $2.50 - $3 per 100,000 unit trade, but in exchange offers you access to a proprietary software platform that is superior to most online brokers’ platforms, or some other benefit. In this case, it may be worth paying the small commission for this additional service.

Choosing a Forex Broker

As a trader, you should always consider the total package when deciding on a broker, in addition to the type of spreads the broker offers. For example, some brokers may offer excellent spreads but their platforms may not have all the bells and whistles that are offered by competitors. When choosing a brokerage firm, you should check out the following:

How well capitalized is the firm?
How long has it been in business?
Who manages the firm and how much experience does this person have?
Which and how many banks does the firm have relationships with?
How much volume does it transact each month?
What are its liquidity guarantees in terms of order size?
What is its margin policy?
What is its rollover policy in case you want to hold your positions overnight?
Does the firm pass through the positive carry, if there is one?
Does the firm add a spread to the rollover interest rates?
What kind of platform does it offer?
Does it have multiple order types, such as “order cancels order” or “order sends order”?
Does it guarantee to execute your stop losses at the order price?
Does the firm have a dealing desk?
What do you do if your internet connection is lost and you have an open position?
Does the firm provide all the back-end office functions, such as P&L, in real time?

Conclusion

Even though you might think you are getting a deal when paying a variable spread, you may be sacrificing other benefits. But one thing is certain: As a trader you always pay the spread and your broker always earns the spread. To get the best deal possible, choose a reputable broker who is well capitalized and has strong relationships with the large foreign exchange banks. Examine the spreads on the most popular currencies. Very often, they will be as little as 1.5 pips. If this is the case, a variable spread may work out to be cheaper than a fixed spread. Some brokers even offer you the choice of either a fixed spread or a variable one. In the end, the cheapest way to trade is with a very reputable market maker who can provide the liquidity you need to trade well.

Think on it…

The Judicial system no longer represents the people. Instead it protects the system from the people. When former Attorney General Ramsey Clark, asked the question, “Who will protect the public when the government violates the law?” Did he also give us the answer? The Sovereign is of course, the highest authority as to the interpretation of the spirit of the law, or as to questions concerning its enforcement. We The People through our power of the Grand Jury and Trial Jury are the two most important branches of our lawful government. We are the final check and balance of our government. We must judge not from the appearance of the law. We must judge with righteous judgment. We must judge whether the law itself is righteous.

The current jury selection process opens the door to stacking the deck (jury). The lawyers question the prospective jurors and each decide which ones would be more likely to convict or acquit the defendant.

A prime example of this occurred in Dallas, Texas. Whereas, a prospective juror, Dianna Brandborg refused to answer questions regarding her income, religious beliefs, the kind of T.V. programs she watches, and the kind of books she reads. Ms. Brandborg felt the questions were an invasion of her privacy and did not have anything to do with the murder trial. Apparently the judge disagreed and sentenced her to 3 days in jail for contempt of court. The judge felt these questions were necessary in order to assure a fair murder trial. (San Diego Union-Tribune, May 6, 1994)

The following is the oath the jury takes: Code of Civil Procedure, Section 232 (b), “As soon as the selection of the trial jury is completed, the following acknowledgment and agreement shall be obtained from the jurors, which shall be acknowledged, `I do’:

Do you * * * and each of you understand and agree that you will well and truly try the cause now pending before the court, and a true verdict rendered according only to the evidence presented to you and to the instructions of the court.” Why don’t they take an oath to preserve and defend the Constitution?

As we can see from the juror oath, the judge sits there in his black robe with his gavel in his hand, and allows only what evidence, he decides will be admitted in his court. He strikes from the record statements made by witnesses and instructs jurors to disregard such statements. He gives instructions to the jury and tells them they can only judge the facts and evidence (that he allowed) and he will determine the law. His power over evidence and jury instructions can convict the innocent and acquit the guilty. If this is not “Jury tampering”, then I wish someone would write to me and explain the difference.

To illustrate the power of the judge over the jury, let us take the widely published Rodney King trial and how jury instructions could be used to acquit the police officers. For example, if the instruction to the jury was as simple as, “If the officers felt they were using reasonable force, you must acquit them.” What choice would the jury have other than acquittal? The officers defense was “they thought they were using reasonable force” and the jury was under oath to follow the instructions of the judge. Like it or not, this is the kind of injustice we have in America today, because that was part of the jury instructions given by the judge.

Ladies and gentlemen, too many good people are being jailed as they try to battle the “kangaroo courts” on the court’s terms. Worse yet, some are being murdered by the government without even being given a chance of a trial by jury. As the old saying goes, “How much justice (bribery) can you afford?”

The County Grand Jury is also stacked. In California each Grand Jury member is nominated by a Superior Court Judge and the Presiding Judge selects the Jury Foreman. The Grand Jury is then indoctrinated by the local District Attorney. The jury foreman screens all correspondence from the citizens to the grand jury. He alone determines what shall go before the different grand jury committees. In short, by plan and design the government, acting through the U.S. Attorney’s office, the District Attorney’s office, and the Department of Justice, has converted the Grand Jury and Trial jury procedures into acts of total oppression against the people, and in total destruction of their constitutional rights.

Now, let us look at how the judicial system for trial and/or grand jury selection is made under the Common Law and the Compiled Laws of California; Acts of the Legislature passed at the Sessions of 1850-1851-1852-1853: The names of 50 people are taken from the assessment roll of the county, each name is written on a separate piece of paper and placed in a box prepared by the county clerk for that purpose. In the presence of the county judge and sheriff, the county clerk draws the names of 12 persons to serve as jurors. The sheriff summons the 12 persons and the jury is seated. These legislative acts have never been repealed. I think you will agree, it would be hard to stack the jury using this method.

Under the Common Law the judge sits there with gavel in his hand to keep order in the court, to act as a referee and to answer any questions from the jury regarding the law.

Since the jurors are the ones who judge whether the defendant is guilty or innocent, all the evidence is submitted directly to the jury. They determine as individuals what evidence is relevant or irrelevant to the case. Not the judge! This simple common sense, Common Law prevents the judge from withholding (tampering) evidence from the jury.

The jurors, as individuals, determine what statements made by the witness are relevant, and have the right to question the witness. The jurors will make the final judgment of innocence or guilt. So, it only makes common sense that they have the right to leave no question go unanswered.

Finally, under the Common Law, the jury instructions given by the judge empowers the jury to judge not only the facts and evidence, but the power to judge the law. For example, if a law is passed that reads, “Police officers may strike any suspect up to 50 times in their head with a lead pipe and it shall be deemed to be reasonable force.” Of course this is a ridicules law. Under the common law the jury has the power to bring in a guilty verdict against a police officer who only strikes a suspect 49 times. The jury is the final check and balance. This power is secured under Article 1 Section 9 of the California Constitution (1849), “. . . and the jury shall have the right to determine the law and the fact.”

The Supreme Court had this to say about the power of the jury, “. . . it is presumed, that the juries are the best judges of facts; it is on the other hand, presumed that the courts are the best judges of law. But still both objects are within your power of decision . . . You [the jury] have a right to take upon yourself to judge both, and to determine the law as well as the facts in controversy.” (State of Georgia vs. Brailsford)

In U.S. vs. Dougherty, the court declared the jury as a, “. . . constitutional thorn in the flesh . . .” to the court because one Juror, standing firm, saying NOT GUILTY can strike down ANY law. The Court has ruled that the Jury has the power, but they are NOT being told of their power and right. The court went on to say, “The jury has an unreviewable and unreversible power . . . to acquit in disregard to the instructions on the law by a trial judge . . . The pages of history shine on instances of the jury’s exercise of its prerogative to disregard instructions of the judge . . . Jury lawlessness is the greatest corrective of law in its actual administration. The will of the state at large imposed on a reluctant community, the will of a majority imposed on a vigorous and determined minority, find the same obstacle in the local JURY that formerly confronted kings and ministers.”

Thomas Jefferson said, “I consider trial by jury as the only anchor ever yet imagined by man, by which government can be held to the principles of its Constitution.”

Alexander Hamilton proclaimed, “Jurors should acquit even against the judges instructions . . . if exercising their judgment with discretion and honesty they have a clear conviction that the charge of the court is wrong.”

Lord Denman declared, “Every jury in the land is tampered with and falsely instructed by the judge when it is told it must take as law that which is given to them, or that they must bring on a certain verdict, or that they can only decide the facts of the case.”

As John Jay, 1st Chief Justice U.S. Supreme Court, put it, “The jury has the right to judge both the law as well as the fact in controversy.” In other words, the jury can find a man NOT GUILTY of breaking a bad law. It is called “jury nullification.”

“The jury who shall try the cause shall have the right to determine the law and the fact, under the directions of the court.” (Sect. 3, of The Act of Congress of July 14, 1798, C 74)

The power of jury nullification is confirmed by the courts in the case of U.S. vs. Moylan, 417 F 2d 1002, 1006 (1969): “We recognize, as appellants urge, the undisputed power of the jury to acquit, even if the verdict is contrary to the law as given by the judge, and contrary to the evidence. This is a power that must exist as long as we adhere to the general verdict in criminal cases, for the courts cannot search the minds of the jurors to find the basis upon which they judge. If the jury [one juror] feels the law under which the defendant is accused is unjust, or the exigent circumstances justified the actions of the accused, or for any reason which appeals to their logic or passion, the jury has the power to acquit and the courts must abide by that decision.”

“The common law right of the jury to determine the law as well as the facts remains unimpaired.” (State vs. Croteau, 23 Vt, 14, 54)

John Adams said, “It is not only . . . [the trial juror’s] right, but his duty, in that case, to find the verdict according to his best understanding, judgment, and conscience, though in direct opposition to the direction of the court.”

“It seems that the court instructs the juries, in criminal cases, not to bind their consciences, but to inform their judgments, but they are not in duty bound to adopt its opinion as their own.” (Lynch vs. State, 9 Ind 541)

“The jury have a right to disregard the opinion of the court, in a criminal case, even on questions of law, if they are fully satisfied that such opinion is wrong.” (People vs. Videto, Cr. R. 603)

Lysander Spooner maintained, “For more than six hundred years - that is, since the Magna Carta, in 1215, there has been no clearer principle of English or American constitutional law, than in criminal cases, it is not only the right and duty of juries to judge what are the facts, what is the law, and what was the moral intent of the accused; but that it is also their right, and their primary and paramount duty, to judge of the justice of law, and to hold all laws invalid, that are, in their opinion unjust or oppressive, and all persons guiltless in violating, or resisting the execution of, such laws.” (”An Essay on the Trial by Jury”, 1852)

“It is universally conceded that a verdict of acquittal, although rendered against the instructions of the judge, is final, and cannot be set aside; and consequently that the jury have the legal power to decide for themselves the law involved in the general issue of guilty or not guilty.” (Hansen vs. U.S., 156 U.S. 51, 172)

“In criminal cases, the jury are the judges of the law as well as the facts; and it is error in the court to restrict them to the law as given in charge by the court.” (McGuthrie vs. State, 17 Ga. 497)

Let us take a look at what how Webster’s Dictionary defined the word “Jury” in 1828 and how Black’s Law Dictionary defines it in 1994.

Jury - “A number of freeholder’s, selected in the manner prescribed by law, empaneled and sworn to inquire into and try any matter of fact, and to declare the truth on the evidence given them in the case . . . consisting usually of twelve men, attend courts to try matters of fact in civil causes, and to decide both the law and the fact in criminal prosecutions.” (Webster’s, 1828)

Jury - “A certain number of men and women selected according to law, and sworn to inquire of certain matters of fact, and to declare the truth upon evidence laid before them . . . see jury instructions.” (Black’s Law, 1994)

Jury Instructions - “A direction given by the judge to the jury concerning the law of the case; a statement made by the judge to the jury informing them of the law applicable to the case in general or some aspect of it; an exposition or the rules or principles of law applicable to the case or some branch or phase of it, which the jury are bound to accept.” (Black’s Law, 1994)

Isn’t it amazing how the lawyers have changed the definition?

We refer to the trial judge as “the judge” but, this cannot be the case in a jury trial. In a jury trial the judges are twelve in number and, are seated in the jury box. They are the ones who will judge the facts and evidence as they see it, not as somebody else sees it.

Samuel Chase, U.S. Supreme Court Justice and signer of the Declaration of Independence had this to say, “The jury has the right to determine both the law and the facts.”

Supreme Court Justice, Oliver Wendell Holmes said, “The jury has the power to bring a verdict in the teeth of both the law and the facts.” (Horning vs. D.C.)

Harlan Stone, 12th Chief Justice U.S. Supreme Court declared, “The law itself is on trial quite as much as the cause which is to be decide.”

The Honorable Parsons had this to say at the Massachusetts convention in 1788, “The people themselves have it in their power effectually to resist usurpation, without being driven to an appeal to arms [revolution]. An act of usurpation is not obligatory; it is NOT law; and any man may be justified in his resistance. Let him be considered as a criminal by the general government, yet only his fellow citizens can convict him; they’re his jury, and if they pronounce him innocent, not ALL the powers of Congress can hurt him; and innocent they certainly will pronounce him if the supposed law he resisted was an act of usurpation.”

“If a juror accepts the law that which the judge states to them that juror has accepted the exercise of absolute authority of a government employee and has surrendered a power and right that once was the citizens safeguard of liberty. For the saddest epitaph which can be carved in memory of a vanished liberty is that which is lost because its possessors failed to stretch forth a saving hand while yet there was time.” (2 Elliot’s Debates)

Thomas Jefferson proclaimed, “I know of no safe depository of the ultimate powers of the society but the people themselves, and if we think them not enlightened enough to exercise their control with a wholesome discretion, the remedy is not to take it from them, but to inform them.”

“If the Government dictate the standard of trial . . . it dictates the results of the trial.” L. Spooner (An Essay on the Trial by Jury)

Despite the overwhelming evidence of the power of the jury. The following memo was issued to all jurors by Presiding Judge Donald Londer, Fourth Judicial District, Multnomah County:

“As you entered the courthouse you may have been given a handout by a person on the sidewalk. That material suggests that as a juror, you have the legal right ignore the judge’s jury instructions in your deliberation.

This information is absolutely wrong.

As a Juror, you will take an oath that you will `render a true verdict according to the law and evidence given you during the trial’

This is a solemn pledge which binds each of you to follow established legal procedures that have existed for over 200 years.

The jury system is the most precious component of our democratic society. It is based upon the fundamental belief that citizen jurors should evaluate the trial evidence and then apply to that evidence the law as given to them by the trial judge.

As your presiding Judge, I urge each of you to conscientiously abide by your jurors oath.”

Perhaps someone should tell this tin god of a judge about the plaque near courtroom number 5 of Old Bailey in London, the memorial has the following words inscribed:

“Near this site William Penn and William Meade were tried in 1670 for preaching to an unlawful assembly . . .

This tablet commemorates the courage and endurance of the jury . . . who refused to give a verdict against them although they [the jury] were locked up without food for two nights, and were fined for their final verdict of not guilty. The case of these jurymen was reviewed on a writ of habeas corpus and Chief Justice Vaughan delivered the opinion of the court which established the right of juries to give their verdict according to their convictions.”

In Mayville, New York, Chautauqua County Town Justice Edward Misfud told us in plain language how his court feels about following the Law, “I may be breaking the laws, but that is the ruling of this court.” With justice like this who needs tyranny?

I think things would be quite different if, Americans would take on the spirit that our ancestors had back in the Old West. In the 1800’s, when a judge came to town and heard a case and decided the case with righteous judgment, he jumped on his horse and rode off to the next town. If he decided the case with the same attitude as our current judges decide cases, he never made it to the next town. Consequently, the judges of the Old West were very careful about tampering with the jury or in the rendering of their own verdicts.

Isn’t the current system of justice demonstrating contempt for Americans by not telling the jurors what true powers they possess, and flagrantly breaking the law? It really does not seem to matter to them, they think they are above the law?

Doesn’t all this make you wonder why judges wear “black” robes? Black is a symbol of deception and darkness.

Abraham Lincoln said, “We the people are the rightful masters of both Congress and the courts - not to overthrow the Constitution, but to overthrow the men who pervert the Constitution.”

In his book “HOW COURTS GOVERN AMERICA”, Judge Richard Neely, of the West Virginia Supreme Appellate Court probably summed up our current judicial system best, when he wrote these words, “Lawyers, certainly, who take seriously recent Supreme Court historical scholarship as applied to the Constitution also probably believe in the Tooth Fairy and the Easter Bunny.”

Judge Neely goes on to write, “Police officers routinely lie, particularly to save their own skins, and when they do, they make credible witnesses.”

More recently, at a campaign meeting for District Attorney candidate, Mr. Paul Pfingst of San Diego, his spokesman made the following speech: The police officers must drum up additional charges so during plea-bargaining, we will have some leverage. Imagine a candidate for the office of District Attorney who supports this kind of flagrant abuse of power by officers of the law who have sworn to uphold the law, not to pervert the law. He will make one hell of a D.A., he’ll fit right in with the rest of the low-life corrupt judges and politicians. San Diegan’s should be proud to have a D. A. with such fine ethics and honesty prosecuting the lawless criminals.

Ladies and gentlemen, the current system of justice has nothing to do with justice, it has become nothing more than another source for collecting revenue from the people. This revenue collecting enterprise has even gone as far as creating “Victimless Crimes.” Think about it! How can someone possibly be guilty of committing a crime without there being a victim to the crime? I think you will agree, if there is no victim, then no crime could have been committed. Isn’t that the way it should be? Yet, the good old lawyers and politicians found a way to get around the necessity of having a victim. They made the criminal the “Victim” to the crime.

* Victimless Crime - “Term applied to a crime which generally involves only the criminal, and which has no direct victim.”

* Black’s Law Dictionary 6th Edition

A wise man once said, “You can only protect your liberties by protecting the other mans freedom. You can only be free if I am FREE.” When We The People are guarding the chicken coop, we can enforce any precept that should be our will. So, if you are chosen for jury duty, remember, you have the final say. YOU ARE THE SUPREME AUTHORITY and THE FINAL CHECK and BALANCE AGAINST TYRANNY!

If you are selected for grand jury duty, call for an investigation of the Federal Reserve, the judicial system, the District Attorney’s office etc. USE YOUR POWER TO INDICT!

If you are called for trial jury forget what the Judge has to say, he is only there as a referee, and to answer questions concerning the law. Say “NOT GUILTY” to bad laws and indict those who seek to usurp the Constitution. Be faithful to your countrymen and become a thorn in the flesh to those who seek to overthrow your liberties. Remember, you are free only when your fellow countrymen are free. Do not let them know, you have the power. Otherwise, they would never let serve on the jury to guard the chicken coop.

Think on it…

This is what the courts had to say about the Federal Reserve System. The following are excerpts from the case of First National Bank vs. Jerome Daly, Presiding Justice of the Peace Martin V. Mahoney ruled:

“The emission of Bills of Credit (by banks) upon their Books, without consideration and the issuance of Federal Reserve Notes without consideration to circulate as legal tender for the payment of debts is not permitted expressly or implied by the Constitution of the United States. Paper, whether money or not, is always illegal unless it is fully representative of some material commodity . . .

The issues in this case were simple. There was no material dispute on the facts for the Jury to resolve.

Plaintiff admitted that it, in combination with the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, which are for all practical purposes, because of their interlocking activity and practices, and both being Banking Institutions Incorporated under the laws of the United States, are in law to be treated as one and the same bank, did create the entire $14,000 in money or credit upon its own books by bookkeeping entry. That this was the Consideration used to support the Note dated May 8, 1964 and the Mortgage of the same date. The money and credit first came into existence when they created It. Mr. Morgan admitted that no United States Law or Statute existed which gave him the right to do this. A lawful consideration must exist and be tendered to support the Note . .

It has been determined, independent of Acts of Congress, that sailing under the license of an enemy is illegal. The emission of Bills of Credit upon books of these private Corporations, for the purposes of private gain is not warranted by the Constitution of the United States and is unlawful . . .

NOTICE OF REFUSAL TO ALLOW APPEAL

To: Hugo L. Hentges, Clerk of the District Court

You will please take Notice that the undersigned Justice of the Peace, Martin V. Mahoney, hereby, pursuant to law, refuses to allow the Appeal in the above entitled action, and refuses to make an entry of such allowance in the undersigned’s Docket. The undersigned also refuses to file in the office of the clerk of the District Court in and for Scott County, Minnesota, a transcript of all entries made in my Docket, together with all process and other papers relating to the action and filed with me as Justice of the Peace.

The undersigned concludes and determines that M.S.A. 532.38 was not complied with within 10 days after entry of Judgment in my Justice of the Peace Court. Subdivision 4 thereof requires that $2.00 shall be paid within 10 days to the clerk of the District Court, for the use of the Justice before whom the cause was tried.

Two so-called “One Dollar” Federal Reserve Notes were deposited with the Clerk of the District Court to be tendered to me.

These Federal Reserve Notes are not lawful money within the contemplation of the Constitution of the United States and are null and void. Further the Notes on their face are not redeemable in Gold or Silver Coin nor there a fund set aside anywhere for the redemption of said Notes . . .

MEMO

I am bound by oath to support the Constitution of the United States and laws passed pursuant thereto and the Constitution and Laws of Minnesota not in conflict therewith. This is an important Case to both parties and involves issues, apparently, not previously decided before. It is also important to the public. The Clerk of the Court is an officer of the Judicial Branch of the State of Minnesota. His act is the act of the State. U.S. Constitution Article 1 Section 10 provides “No State Shall make anything but Gold and Silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts.” The tender of the two Federal Reserve Notes runs counter to the fundamental Law of the land.

The Federal Reserve and National Banks exercise an exclusive monopoly and privilege of creating credit and issuing their notes at the expense of the public, which does not receive a fair equivalent. This scheme is obliquely designed for the benefit of an idle monopoly to rob, blackmail and oppress the producers of wealth. . . It has defied the lawfully Constituted Government . .

Slavery and all its incidents, including Peonage, thralldom and debt created by fraud is universally prohibited in the United States. This case represents but another form of Slavery by the Bankers. Their position is not supported by the Constitution. The people [jury] have spoken their will in terms which cannot be misunderstood. It is indispensable to the preservation of the Union and independence and liberties of the people that this Court adhere only to mandates of the Constitution and administer it as written . . .

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

JUDGMENT AND DETERMINATION

1. That the Federal Reserve Banking Corporation is a United States Corporation with twelve banks throughout the United States. That the First National Bank of Montgomery is also a United States Corporation, incorporated and existing under the laws of the United States and is a member of the Federal Reserve System.

2. That because of the interlocking control activities, transactions and practices, the Federal Reserve Banks and the National Banks are for all practical purposes, in the law, one and the same.

3. As is evidenced from the book “The Federal Reserve System; Its purpose and Function”, put out by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and other evidence adduced herein, the Federal Reserve Banks and National Banks create money and credit upon their books and exercise the ultimate of expanding and reducing the supply of money or credit in these United States.

This creation of money or credit upon the Books of the Banks constitutes the creation of fiat money by bookkeeping entry.

Ninety percent or more of the credit never leaves the books of the Banks so they need produce no specie as backing.

When the Federal Reserve Banks and National Banks acquire United States Bonds and Securities, State Bonds and Securities, State Subdivision Bonds and Securities, mortgages on private Real property and mortgages on private personal property, the said banks create the money and credit upon their books by bookkeeping entry. The first time that the money comes into existence is when they create it. The banks create it out of nothing. No substantial fund of gold or silver is back of it, or any fund at all . . .

The Federal Reserve Notes in question in this case are unlawful and void upon the following grounds:

A. Said Notes are fiat money, not redeemable in gold or silver coin upon their face, not backed by gold or silver, and the notes are in want of some real or substantial fund being provided for their payment in redemption.

B. The Notes are obviously not gold or silver Coin.

C. The sole consideration paid for the One Dollar Federal Reserve Notes is in the neighborhood of nine-tenths of one cent, and therefore, there is no lawful consideration behind said Notes.

D. That said Notes do not conform to Title 12, United States Code, Sections 411 and 418. Title 31 USC, Section 462, insofar as it attempts to make Federal Reserve Notes and circulating Notes of the Federal Reserve Banks and National Banking Associations a legal tender for all debts, public and private, it is unconstitutional and void, being contrary to Article 1, Section 10, of the Constitution of the United States, which prohibits any State from making anything but gold and silver coin a tender, or impairing the obligation of contracts.

Now, therefore, by the virtue of the authority vested in me pursuant to the Declaration of Independence, the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, the Constitution of the United States of America and the Constitution of the State of Minnesota;

It is hereby DETERMINED, ORDERED AND ADJUDGED, that the Appeals Statutes of the State of Minnesota for Civil Appeals from this Court to the District Court is not complied with within 10 days after entry of Judgment. Therefore the Appeal is not allowed by this Court and my Docket so shows.”

BY THE COURT

Martin V. Mahoney
Justice of the Peace
Credit River Township
Scott County, Minnesota

The Sheriff’s sale of Mr. Daly’s home was declared null and void. The court ordered the Sheriff to return the home to Mr. Daly, or he, the judge would have the Citizens of the County carry out the order. This landmark case has been kept from the eyes of the sleeping nation. Their motto is, “What the people don’t know can’t hurt us. Let us keep it that way.”

Regarding the power to delegate the control of our money supply to a private corporation can be found in 16 Am Jur 2d, Section 347, which states: “The rule has become fixed that the legislature may not delegate legislative functions to private persons or groups, or to private corporations or a group of private corporations.” Maybe someone needs to read the law to Congress because the have delegated the legislative function of controlling or money supply to a “private” corporation.

The following court cases support the fact that the banks are fraudulently making loans:

“A national bank has no power to lend its credit.” (Farmers & Miners Bank vs. Bluefield National Bank, 11 F2d 83, 271 US 669)

“Banking Associations from the very nature of their business are prohibited from lending credit.” (St. Louis Savings Bank vs. Parmalee 95 U. S. 557)

“National Banks may lend their money but not their credit.” (Norton Grocery vs. Peoples National Bank, 144 S.E. 501, 151 Va. 195)

“Neither, as to include in its powers not incidental to them, is it a part of a bank’s business to lend its credit. If a bank could lend its credit as well as its money, it might, if it received compensation and was not careful to put its name only to solid paper, make a great deal more than any lawful interest on its money would amount to. If not careful, the power would be the mother of panics . . . Indeed, lending credit is the exact opposite of lending money, which is the real business of banking, for while the latter creates a liability in favor of the bank, the former gives rise to a liability of the bank to another.” (American Express Co. vs. Citizens State Bank, 194 NW 429)

“A bank can lend its money but not its credit.” (First National Bank of Tallapoosa vs. Monroe, 135 Ga 614, 69 SE 1123, 32 LRA)

“It is not within the statutory powers for a national bank, even though solvent, to lend its credit . . .” (First Intermediate Credit Bank vs. Herisson, 33 F 2nd 841)

“A national bank, under federal law being limited in its powers and capacity, cannot lend its credit.” (Howard & Foster Co. vs. Citizens National Bank of Union, 133 SC 202, 130 SE 758)

“Banking corporations cannot lend credit.” (First National Bank of Amarillo vs. Slaton Independent School District, Tex Civ App 1933, 58 SW 2d 870)

“There is no doubt but what the law is that a national bank cannot lend its credit or become an accommodation endorser.” (National Bank of Commerce vs. Atkinson, 55 Fed Rep 465)

“Nowhere is the express authority granted to the corporation to lend its credit.” (Gardilner Trust vs. Augusta Trust, 134 Me 191; 291 US 245)

“A national bank has no authority to lend its credit.” (Johnston vs. Charlottesville National Bank, C.C. Va. 1879, Fed Cas. 7425)

“A contract made by a corporation beyond the scope of its power corporate powers is unlawful and void.” (McCormick vs. Market National Bank, 165 U.S. 538)

“A national bank . . . cannot lend its credit to another by becoming surety, endorser, or guarantor for him, such an act is ultra vires . . .” (Merchants’ Bank vs. Baird, 160 F 642)

Despite the above court cases, Ralph Gelder, Superintendent, Department of Banks and Banking, State of Maine, said on Feb. 20, 1974, “A commercial bank is able to make a loan by simply creating a new demand deposit (so called checkbook money) through bookkeeping entry.” This is in total contradiction to what the courts have said. Yet, that is exactly how the banksters create the money to loan to its customers or to buy government bonds.

“Federal Reserve bank credit does not consist of funds that the Reserve authorities get somewhere in order to lend, but constitute funds that they are empowered to create.” (Federal Reserve Bank: Its Purposes and Functions, 1939 Edition)

“Act is ultra vires when corporation is without authority to perform it under any circumstance or for any purpose. By doctrine of ultra vires a contract made by a corporation beyond the scope of its corporate powers is unlawful.” (Community Fed S&L vs. Fields, 128 F 2nd 705)

“A bank is not the holder in due course upon merely crediting the depositors account.” (Bankers Trust vs. Nagler 229, NYS 2nd 142)

“A holder who does not give value cannot qualify as a holder in due course.” (Uniform Commercial Code 3-303.1)

“Checks, drafts, money orders and bank notes [Federal Reserve Notes] are not lawful money of the United States.” (State vs. Nealan, 48 Ore. 155)

“When an instrument [notes] lacks an unconditional promise to pay a sum certain at a fixed and determined time, it is only an acknowledgement of the debt and statutory presumptions like the presence of a valuable consideration, are not applicable.” (Bader vs. Williams, 61 A 2d 637)

“A note is not negotiable unless it is payable at a time in the future.” (Rhodes vs. Schofield, 82 So. 2d 236)

In a letter dated May 7, 1981, Michael Hodge, Assistant Attorney General, State of Michigan wrote, “Please be advised the United States Constitution Article I, Section 10 is binding on the States.”

This is confirmed in Carol Zurn vs. Val Bjornson, Treasurer, State of Minnesota. Whereas, the plaintiff sued the defendant for payment in gold or silver Coin on a check drawn on the Treasury of the State of Minnesota. Justice of the Peace, Bill Drexler handed down this ruling: “Plaintiff is entitled to receive payment in gold and silver Coin in satisfaction of said check . . . Pursuant to LAW ONE DOLLAR is equal to 23.22 grains of pure gold or 371.25 grains of pure silver . . . Pursuant to Law neither this court nor the Treasurer of the State of Minnesota, the Defendant herein, can make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in payment of debts.”

Justice of the Peace, Bill Drexler took his decision one step farther, he declared, “That Title 12, Sections 95a and Title 31, Section 443 making it a criminal offense to buy and sell gold and providing for penalties and confiscation of gold by reason of the possession thereof is unconstitutional and void.”

In Bronson vs. Rhodes, the court ruled, “Lawful money of the United States could only be gold and silver, or that which by law is made its equivalent, so as to be exchangeable therefore at par and on demand.” (74 U.S. 229, 247, 19 L. Ed. 141)

According to 12 USCS, Section 411, “. . . They [Federal Reserve Notes] shall be redeemed in lawful money on demand at the Treasury Department of the United States, in the city of Washington, D.C., or at any Federal Reserve bank.” If Federal Reserve Notes shall be redeemed in `lawful’ money, what kind of money would be unlawful?

“If money does not have the value it purports to have on its face, it cannot be legal tender.” (Craig vs. Missouri, 29 U.S. 410) Try to redeem your legal tender Federal Reserve Notes for Gold or Silver. Good Luck!

“The United States is a national state which has a central banking system, the Federal Reserve System, and whose currency, for domestic purposes, is not convertible into any commodity.” Beardsley Ruml, Chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 1946

The Honorable Larry Moritz, Municipal Judge, Spearville, Kansas, declared in 1981, “If Congress won’t keep its part of the Constitutional bargain and coin money of gold and silver like Article I, Section 8, Clause 5 commands, there’s no way my court can require anyone to pay fines. I am not here to protect certain people’s investments, I am here to carry out the mandate of the U.S. and the Kansas Constitutions.” Thank God we have some righteous judges still left in our Nation.

Bruce A. Budlong of the Department of the Treasury said, “The same monetary system that was established on April 2, 1792, is in effect today.”

Section 20 of the 1792 Coinage Act, 1 Stat. 246 stipulates: “. . . That the money of the account of the United States shall be expressed in dollars . . . and that all accounts in the public offices and all proceedings in the courts of the United States shall be kept and in conformity to this regulation.” This section of the Act has never been repealed and is still in effect today.

Section 314 of USCS 31 states the standard unit value as “the dollar consisting of 24 8/10 grains of gold, nine tenths fine and/or 371.25 grains of .999 fine silver as established shall be the standard unit of value, and all forms of money issued and coined by the United States shall be maintained at a parity of the value with this standard, and it shall be the duty of the Secretary of the Treasury to maintain such parity.”

The Section 19 of the 1792 Coinage Act states, “That if any of the gold or silver coins which shall be struck or coined at the said mint shall be debased or made worse as to the proportion of fine gold or silver therein contained, or shall be less weight or value than the same out to be pursuant to the direction of this act, through the default or with connivance of any officers or persons who shall be employed at the said mint, for the purpose of profit or gain, or otherwise with a fraudulent intent, if any of the said officers or persons shall embezzle any of the metals . . . every such officer or person who shall commit any or either of the said offenses, shall be deemed guilty of felony, and shall suffer DEATH.”

Reach into your pocket, look at the money. The silver and gold have been embezzled by the Federal Reserve! The law did not say, 25 years to life imprisonment, it says “DEATH”! They have been charged with the crime and must be sentenced accordingly.

Pursuant to 12 United States Code, (hereafter, U.S.C.) Sections 341, Paragraph 8: 12 USC 104, 109, 123, and 110. Federal Reserve Notes must express “. . . upon their face that they are secured by United States Bonds deposited with the Treasurer of the United States, by the written or engraved signatures of the Treasurer and Register, and by the imprint of the seal of the Treasury; and shall also express upon their face the promise of the association receiving the same to pay on demand, attested by the written or engraved signatures of the president or vice president and cashier; and other such statements and in such form as the Sec. of Treasury directs.”

Do the Federal Reserve Notes in your pocket meet these requirements? Just don’t sit there, take one out and see for yourself.

18 USC 334 makes it a “FELONY” to deliver and put in circulation any Federal Reserve Notes in violation of the above statues in Title 12. See 18 USC Sections 1, (Offenses classified); Sec. 2. (Principals); Sec. 3. (Accessory after the fact); Sec. 4. (Misprision of felony); Sec. 371. (Conspiracy); Sec. 1341. (Frauds and swindles); Sec. 1343 (Fraud by wire;) and most of all 18 USC Sec. 1960 to 1965. (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations) Aren’t all banks guilty of the above?

* Counterfeiter - “One who unlawfully makes base coin in imitation of the true metal, or forges false currency, or any instrument of writing bearing a likeness and similarity to that which is lawful and genuine, with an intention of deceiving and imposing another.”

* Counterfeit coin - “Coin not genuine, but resembling or apparently intended to resemble or pass for genuine coin, including genuine coin prepared or altered so as to resemble or pass for a coin of a higher denomination.”

* Lawful Money - “Money which is legal tender in payments of debt. See Legal Tender.”

* Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th Edition

Section 5103 of 31 USC, defines legal tender as, “United States coins and currency (including Federal reserve notes and circulating notes of Federal Reserve Banks and national banks) are legal tender for all debts, public charges, taxes, and dues. Foreign gold and silver coins are not tender for debts.”

Isn’t it amazing how they have changed the definition of lawful money (gold and silver), to mean legal plunder (tender)?

The thieves have gone to far with their TREASONOUS laws. They are forcing us to use their counterfeit “DEBT” Notes and outlawing foreign gold and silver coins for payment of debt. What would you rather have, an ounce of foreign gold or their “FIAT” money? The simple law of math proves that we cannot finance ourselves out of debt by going into debt. Yet, our political paid “TRAITORS” (leaders) keep playing right into their hands. It is time the ALMIGHTY MASS puts a stop to this MADNESS!

Lincoln proclaimed, “To compel a man to furnish funds for the propagation of ideas he disbelieves and abhors is sinful and tyrannical . . . The government should create, issue and circulate all the money and currency, needed to satisfy the spending power of the government and the buying power of the consumer. The privilege of creating and issuing money is not only the supreme prerogative of government, but it is the governments greatest opportunity . . . The people can and will be furnished with a currency as safe as their own government. Money will cease to be the master and become the servant of humanity . . . We gave the people of this Republic the greatest blessing they ever had - their own paper money to pay their own debts . . . Democracy will rise superior to the money power.”

The MONEY-CHANGERS realized the loss they would incur if, their paper-money was replaced with “government paper-money”. As a result, this is what they had to say about President Lincoln’s issuance of a national paper currency, sometimes referred to as “Greenbacks.” “If that mischievous financial policy, which had its origins in the North America Republic during the late war [Civil War] in that country, should become indurated down to a fixture, then that government will furnish its own paper money without cost. It will have ALL the money necessary to carry on its commerce. It will become prosperous beyond precedent in the history of the civilized governments of the world. That government must be destroyed or it will destroy every monarchy on the globe.” (London Times 1863)

Bismark, Chancellor of Germany, made the following statement regarding the death of Lincoln: “The death of Lincoln was a disaster for Christendom. There was no man in the United States great enough to wear his boots, and [the MONEY-CHANGERS] went anew to grab the riches of the world. I fear that foreign bankers with their craftiness and tortuous tricks will entirely control the exuberant riches of America, and use it to systematically corrupt modern civilization. They will not hesitate to plunge the whole Christendom into wars and chaos in order that the earth should become their inheritance.”

If you think our Constitution is antiquated, and Gold and Silver will not work, then how do you explain the Island of Guernsey, located of the English Channel? Guernsey has followed our constitutional taxing system along with our constitutional honest money - no interest banking procedures, backed by Gold and Silver for over 175 years. Today, Guernsey enjoys a high standard of living, no unemployment, a modern infrastructure and no government debt. Guernsey is proof that it can and does work.

WAKE-UP AMERICA and take a closer look at what happened to some of those out spoken critics of the Federal Reserve. Lincoln was assassinated by Booth! Kennedy was (supposedly) assassinated by Oswald! Garfield was assassinated by Guiteau! Mckinley was assassinated by Czolgosz! After 3 attempts on his life, McFadden was found dead in his ransacked office! His autopsy shows he died of natural causes. Assassination attempts were made on the lives of Presidents Jackson and Reagan! Lindbergh’s grandson was kidnaped! Justice of the Peace Mahoney died mysteriously within months after the bank lost its case and that historical decision was handed down. The defendant, Jerome Daly, an Attorney, was later disbarred from the Bar Association and became a political prisoner. Justice of the Peace Bill Drexler was also disbarred and he too became a political prisoner. Will this ADVERSARY stop at nothing? Or, is it just a coincidence that those who were strong critics of the MONEY-CHANGERS and supporters of the Constitution were targeted for assassination or became political prisoners?

“How long will they kill our prophets, while we stand aside and look. Some say it’s just a part of it, we’ve got to fulfill the book.” Bob Marley (another victim of assassination.)

They have been charged with the crimes against our nation. If our elected representatives will not do anything to stop this atrocity, then We The People must take action.

Or are we going to sit around like the 3 monkeys, “Hearing no evil! Seeing no evil! Not speaking of the evil!” If so, evil will prevail. If, you do not want to do something about these truths, then listen to the politicians. They will tell you all the lies you want to hear. Their rhetoric will keep you dreaming the American dream. What action you, as a citizen can take will be discussed later.

Think on it…

[From Lysander Spooner]

To Thomas F. Bayard, of Delaware:

Sir — I have read your letter to Rev. Lyman Abbott, in which you express the opinion that it is at least possible for a man to be a legislator (under the Constitution of the United States) and yet be an honest man.

This proposition implies that you hold it to be at least possible that some four hundred men should, by some process or other, become invested with the right to make laws of their own — that is, laws wholly of their own device, and therefore necessarily distinct from the law of nature, of the principles of natural justice; and that these laws of their own making shall be really and truly obligatory upon the people of the United States; and that, therefore, the people may rightfully be compelled to obey them.

All this implies that you are of the opinion that the Congress of the United States, of which you are a member, has by some process or other, become possessed of some right of arbitrary dominion over the people of the United States; which right of arbitrary dominion is not given by, and is, therefore, necessarily in conflict with, the law of nature, the principles of natural justice, and the natural rights of men, as individuals. All this is necessarily implied in the idea that the Congress now possesses any right whatever to make any laws whatever, of its own device — that is, any laws that shall be either more, less, or other than that natural law, which it can neither make, unmake, nor alter — and cause them to be enforced upon the people of the United States, or any of them, against their will.

You assume that the right of arbitrary dominion — that is, [*4] the right of making laws of their own device, and compelling obedience to them — is a “trust” that has been delegated to those who now exercise that power. You call it “the trust of public power.”

But, Sir, you are mistaken in supposing that any such power has ever been delegated, or ever can be delegated, by any body, to any body.

Any such delegation of power is naturally impossible, for these reasons, viz:

1. No man can delegate, or give to another, any right of arbitrary dominion over himself; for that would be giving himself away as a slave. And this no one can do. Any contract to do so is necessarily an absurd one, and has no validity. To call such a contract a “constitution,” or by any other high-sounding name, does not alter its character as an absurd and void contract.

2. No man can delegate, or give to another, any right of arbitrary dominion over a third person; for that would imply a right in the first person, not only to make the third person his slave, but also a right to dispose of him as a slave to still other persons. Any contract to do this is necessarily a criminal one, and therefore invalid. To call such a contract a “constitution” does not at all lessen its criminality, or add to its validity.

These facts, that no man can delegate, or give away, his own natural right to liberty, nor any other man’s natural right to liberty, prove that he can delegate no right of arbitrary dominion whatever — or, what is the same thing, no legislative power whatever — over himself or anybody else, to any man, or body of men.

This impossibility of any man’s delegating any legislative power whatever, necessarily results from the fact that the law of nature has drawn the line — and that, too, [*5] a line that can never be effaced nor removed — between each man’s own interest and inalienable rights of person and property, and each and every other man’s inherent and inalienable rights of person and property. It, therefore, necessarily fixes the unalterable limits, within which every man may rightfully seek his own happiness, in his own way, free from all responsibility to, or interference by, his fellow men, or any of them.

All this pretended delegation of legislative power — that is, of a power, on the part of the legislators, so-called, to make any laws of their own device, distinct from the law of nature — is therefore an entire falsehood; a falsehood whose only purpose is to cover and hide a pure usurpation, by one body of men, of arbitrary dominion over other men.

That this legislative power, or power of arbitrary dominion, is a pure usurpation, on the part of those who now exercise it, and not a “trust” delegated to them, is still further proved by the fact that the only delegation of power, that is even professed or pretended to be made, is made secretly — that is, by secret ballot — and not in any open and authentic manner; and therefore not by any men, or body of men, who make themselves personally responsible, as principals, for the acts of those to whom they profess to delegate the power.

All this pretended delegation of power having been made secretly — that is, only by secret ballot — not a single one of all the legislators, so-called, who profess to be exercising only a delegated power, has himself any legal knowledge, or can offer any legal proof, as to who the particular individuals were who delegated it to him. And having no power to identify the individuals who professed to delegate the power to him, he cannot show any legal proof that anybody ever even attempted or pretended to delegate it to him.

Plainly, a man who exercises any arbitrary dominion over other men and who claims to be exercising only a delegated power, but cannot show who his principals are, nor, conse- [*6] quently, prove that he has any principals, must be presumed, both in law and reason, to have no principals; and therefore to be exercising no power but his own. And having, of right, no such power of his own, he is, both in law and reason, a naked usurper.

Sir, a secret ballot makes a secret government; and a secret government is a government by conspiracy; in which the people at large can have no rights. And that is the only government we now have. It is the government of which you are a voluntary member and supporter, and yet you claim to be an honest man. If you are an honest man, is not your honesty that of a thoughtless, ignorant man, who merely drifts with the current, instead of exercising any judgement of his own?

For still another reason, all legislators, so-called, under the Constitution of the United States, are exercising simply an arbitrary and irresponsible dominion of their own; and not any authority that has been delegated, or pretended to have been delegated, to them. And that reason is that the Constitution itself (Article 1, Section 6) prescribes that:–

“For any speech or debate (or vote) in either house, they (the Senators and Representatives) shall not be questioned (held to any legal responsibility) in any other place.”

This provision makes the legislators constitutionally irresponsible to anybody; either to those on whom they exercise their power, or to those who may have, either openly or secretly, attempted or pretended to delegate power to them. And men who are legally responsible to nobody for their acts, cannot truly be said to be the agents of any body, or to be exercising any power but their own; for all real agents are necessarily responsible both to those on whom they act, and to those for whom they act.

To say that the people of this country ever have bound, or ever could bind, themselves by any contract whatever — the [*7] Constitution, or any other — to thus give away all their natural rights of property, liberty, and life, into the hands of a few men — a mere conclave — and that they should make it a part of the contract itself that these few men should be held legally irresponsible for the disposal they should make of those rights, is an utter absurdity. It is to say that they have bound themselves, and that they could bind themselves, by an utterly idiotic and suicidal contract.

If such a contract had ever been made by one private individual to another, and had been signed, sealed, witnessed, acknowledged, and delivered, with all possible legal formalities, no decent court on earth — certainly none in this country — would have regarded it, for a moment, as conveying any right, or delegating any power, or as having the slightest legal validity, or obligation.

For all the reasons now given, and for still others that might be given, the legislative power now exercised by Congress is, in both law and reason, a purely personal, arbitrary, irresponsible, usurped dominion on the part of the legislators themselves, and not a power delegated to them by anybody.

Yet under the pretense that this instrument gives them the right of an arbitrary and irresponsible dominion over the whole people of the United States, Congress has now gone on, for ninety years and more, filling great volumes with laws of their own device, which the people at large have never read, nor even seen nor ever will read or see; and of whose legal meanings it is morally impossible that they should ever know anything. Congress has never dared to require the people even to read these laws. Had it done so, the oppression would have been an intolerable one; and the people, rather than endure it, would have either rebelled, and overthrown the government, or would have fled the country. Yet these laws, which Congress has not dared to require the people even to read, it has compelled them, at the point of the bayonet, to obey. [*8]

And this moral, and legal, and political monstrosity is the kind of government which Congress claims that the Constitution authorizes it to impose upon the people.

Sir, can you say that such an arbitrary and irresponsible dominion as this, over the properties, liberties, and lives of fifty millions of people — or even over the property, liberty, or life of any one of those fifty millions — can be justified on any reason whatever? If not, with what color of truth can you say that you yourself, or anybody else, can act as a legislator, under the Constitution of the United States, and yet be an honest man?

To say that the arbitrary and irresponsible dominion, that is exercised by Congress, has been delegated to it by the Constitution, and not solely by the secret ballots of the voters for the time being, is the height of absurdity; for what is the Constitution? It is, at best, a writing that was drawn up more than ninety years ago; was assented to at the time only by a small number of men; generally those few white male adults who had prescribed amounts of property; probably not more than two hundred thousand in all; or one in twenty of the whole population.

Those men have been long since dead. They never had any right of arbitrary dominion over even their contemporaries; and they never had any over us. Their wills or wishes have no more rightful authority over us, than have the wills or wishes of men who lived before the flood. They never personally signed, sealed, acknowledged, or delivered, or dared to sign, seal, acknowledge, or deliver, the instrument which they imposed upon the country as law. They never, in any open and authentic manner, bound even themselves to obey it, or made themselves personally responsible for the acts of their so-called agents under it, They had no natural right to impose it, as law, upon a single human being. The whole proceeding was a pure usurpation. [*9]

In practice, the Constitution has been an utter fraud from the beginning. Professing to have been “ordained and established” by “We, the people of the United States,” it has never been submitted to them, as individuals, for their voluntary acceptance or rejection. They have never been asked to sign, seal, acknowledge, or deliver it, as their free act and deed. They have never signed, sealed, acknowledged, or delivered it, or promised, or laid themselves under any kind of obligation, to obey it. Very few of them have ever read, or even seen it; or ever will read or see it. Of its legal meaning (if it can be said to have any) they really know nothing; and never did, nor ever will, know anything.

Why is it, Sir, that such an instrument as the Constitution, for which nobody has been responsible, and of which few persons have ever known anything, has been suffered to stand, for the last ninety years, and to be used for such audacious and criminal purposes? It is solely because it has been sustained by the same kind of conspiracy as that by which it was established; that is, by the wealth and the power of those few who were to profit by the arbitrary dominion it was assumed to give them over others. While the poor, the weak, and the ignorant, who were to be cheated, plundered, and enslaved by it, have been told, and some of them doubtless made to believe, that it is a sacred instrument, designed for the preservation of their rights.

These cheated, plundered, and enslaved persons have been made to feel, if not to believe, that the Constitution had such miraculous power, that it could authorize the majority (or even a plurality) of the male adults, for the time being — a majority numbering at this time, say, five millions in all — to exercise, through their agents, secretly appointed, an arbitrary and irresponsible dominion over the properties, liberties, and lives of the whole fifty millions; and that these fifty millions have no rightful alternative but to submit all their rights to this arbi- [*10] trary dominion, or suffer such confiscation, imprisonment, or death as this secretly appointed, irresponsible cabal, of so-called legislators, should see fit to resort to for the maintenance of its power.

As might have been expected, and as was, to a large degree, at least, intended, this Constitution has been used from the beginning by ambitious, rapacious, and unprincipled men, to enable them to maintain, at the point of the bayonet, an arbitrary and irresponsible dominion over those who were too ignorant and too weak to protect themselves against the conspirators who had thus combined to deceive, plunder, and enslave them.

Do you really think, Sir, that such a constitution as this can avail to justify those who, like yourself, are engaged in enforcing it? Is it not plain, rather, that the members of Congress, as a legislative body, whether they are conscious of it or not, are in reality, a mere cabal of swindlers, usurpers, tyrants and robbers? Is it not plain that they are stupendous blockheads, if they imagine that they are anything else than such a cabal? Or that their so-called laws impose the least obligation upon anybody?

If you have never before looked at this matter in this light, I ask you to do so now. And in the hope to aid you in doing so candidly, and to some useful purpose, I take the liberty to mail for you a pamphlet entitled:

“NATURAL LAW; OR THE SCIENCE OF JUSTICE; a Treatise of Natural Law, Natural Justice, Natural Rights, Natural Liberty, and Natural Society; Showing That All Legislation whatsoever Is an Absurdity, a Usurpation, and a Crime. Part 1.”

In this pamphlet, I have endeavored to controvert distinctly the proposition that, by any possible process whatever, any man, or body of men, can become possessed of any right of arbitrary dominion over other men, or other men’s property; [*11] or, consequently, any right whatever to make any law whatever, of their own — distinct from the law of nature — and compel any other men to obey it.

I trust I need not suspect you, as a legislator under the Constitution, and claiming to be an honest man, of any desire to evade the issue presented in this pamphlet. If you shall see fit to meet it, I hope you will excuse me for suggesting that — to avoid verbiage, and everything indefinite — you give at least a single specimen of a law that either heretofore has been made, or that you conceive it possible for legislators to make — that is, some law of their own device — that either has been, or shall be, really and truly obligatory upon other persons, and which such other persons have been, or may be, rightfully compelled to obey.

If you can either find or devise any such law, I trust you will make it known, that it may be examined, and the question of its obligation be fairly settled in the popular mind.

But if it should happen that you can neither find such a law in the existing statute books of the United States, nor, in your own mind, conceive of such a law as possible under the Constitution, I give you leave to find it, if that be possible, in the constitution or statute book of any other people that now exist, or ever have existed, on the earth.

If, finally, you shall find no such law, anywhere, nor be able to conceive of any such law yourself, I take the liberty to suggest that it is your imperative duty to submit the question to your associate legislators; and, if they can give no light on the subject, that you call upon them to burn all the existing statute books of the United States, and then to go home and content themselves with the exercise of only such rights and powers as nature has given to them in common with the rest of mankind.

Think on it…

THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF ALL STATE LAWS RESTRAINING
PRIVATE BANKING AND THE RATES OF INTEREST.

The Constitution of the United States, (Art. 1, Sec. 10,) declares that “No State shall pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts.”

This clause does not designate what contracts have, and what have not, an “obligation.” It leaves that question to be decided by the proper tribunals. But it plainly recognizes two things, as fixed, consti­tutional principles - first, that there are contracts that have an “obliga­tion;” and, secondly, that the people have a right to enter into, and have the benefit of, all such contracts.

The force of these implications will, perhaps, be more clearly seen, when applied to a particular contract, than when applied to contracts generally. Suppose, then, the constitution had merely said that no State should pass any law impairing the obligation of the marriage con­tract. This provision would have plainly implied, first, that marriage contracts were in their nature obligatory, - and, secondly, that men had a right to enter into that species of contract. But the implications, which would, in this case, have applied to marriage contracts, now apply, under the constitution as it is, to all contracts whatsoever, that are in their nature obligatory.

That this constitutional prohibition, against “impairing the obligation of contracts,” implies that there are contracts having an obligation, no one will deny. But that it also implies that men have a constitutional right to enter into all such contracts, seems also to be perfectly clear.

Suppose the constitution had declared that no State should “pass any law impairing a man’s right to recover the wages of his labor” - This prohibition would have certainly implied that men had a right to labor for wages - and any law that should have forbidden them to labor for wages, would have been as much unconstitutional, as one that should have deprived them of the wages they had earned.

Or suppose again that the constitution had forbidden the States to pass any law impairing the meaning and intent of wills. Such a [*4] provision would have manifestly implied, and therefore established it as a constitutional principle, that all men had a right to make wills. And any law that should have forbidden men to make wills, would have been as much unconstitutional, as one that should have altered or invalidated their meaning and intent when made. So also the prohibition against impairing the obligation of contracts, implies that men have a right to enter into all contracts that have an obligation. And any laws that forbid men to enter into such contracts, are as much unconstitutional, as those that would impair the obligation of the contracts when made.

The assumption, also, in the constitution, that men’s contracts have an “obligation,” implies that the parties have a right to enter into them; for if they have no right to enter into them, no obligation could arise out of them.

This constitutional right of men to enter into all obligatory contracts, is a natural, inherent, inalienable right. It exists antecedently to, and independently of, any positive or municipal law. It may be recog­nized, acknowledged, guarantied, and secured, by the municipal law, but it is not derived from it - nor can the municipal law rightfully take it away. It is an original right of human nature, like the right of speech - the right to enjoy life, liberty and religion - the right to keep and bear arms - and the right of self-protection. And it is as an original right, existing prior to the constitution, that the clause quoted from the constitution, recognizes and guaranties it.

The right to enter into obligatory contracts, is also involved in the right to “acquire property” - for one man can acquire property of anoth­er only by means of an obligatory contract. Every purchase and sale of property that takes place between man and man, involves a contract - that is, an agreement - an assent of their minds to an exchange of values. And every purchase and sale, that takes place between man and man, depends, for its validity, upon the “obligation” of the contract or agreement that the parties have entered into - an obligation, that is protected by the Constitution of the United States.

If the Slate Legislatures had power to declare, even prospectively, what contracts should, and what should not be obligatory, they might arbitrarily prohibit all trade between man and man - they might invali­date, not merely credit contracts, but even those contracts that are exe­cuted at the time they are entered into - for there is no difference in the intrinsic obligation of a contract that is to be executed, and one that is executed. The equitable right of property is transferred as absolutely by an executory, as by an executed contract; and government has as much right to declare, prospectively, that contracts that may afterward be actually executed, shall, notwithstanding, be void; and that men who may sell and deliver property, may nevertheless recover it back, as it has to declare that those who have sold property and promised to deliv­er it, shall still be entitled to retain it -or, what is the same thing, be released from their obligation to deliver it. A promise to pay money, [*5] for value that has been received, is a mere promise to deliver money, that has been sold and paid for - and government has as much right to declare that if a banker shall actually sell and deliver money, he may nevertheless recover it back, as it has to declare that if he promise to deliver money that he has sold, he shall be relieved from his obligation to deliver it. The law, that should enable a man to recover property, that he had actually sold and delivered, would no more interfere with men’s natural rights to acquire property, by contract, or purchase, than the law which should relieve a man from his obligation to deliver prop­erty, which he had sold and promised to deliver. But will any one pretend that government has a right, even by a prospective law, to in­validate contracts that may afterwards be actually executed? If not, he cannot consistently claim that it has a right to invalidate executory contracts - for the equitable right of property passes as absolutely by the latter contract, as the former.

The right to acquire property, is enumerated, in many, if not all, of the State Constitutions, as one of the natural, inherent, inalienable rights of men - one that is not surrendered to government - one which government has no power to infringe - one which government is bound to respect and secure. And this right to acquire property, as was before said, involves the right to enter into obligatory contracts - for men can acquire property of each other, only by such contracts.

The right of men, then, to enter into obligatory contracts, and to have the benefit of them, is guarantied, not only by the national constitu­tion, but also by many, if not all, of the state constitutions. It is, in short, a fundamental principle in our systems of government - as much so, as the right of speech, or the right to life and liberty, or the free exercise of religion, or the right to keep and bear arms, or the right to acquire property.

But notwithstanding the general and State constitutions have thus guarantied to the citizens of this government their natural right to enter into all obligatory contracts with each other, and to have the ob­ligation of their contracts respected, and enforced, it is nevertheless probable that the statute books of every State in the union, contain laws, or the forms of laws, whose avowed and only object is to abridge this right, and impair the obligation of these contracts; and which declare that certain contracts, that may be entered into by bankers and others, to pay money - contracts that are in their nature as obliga­tory as any others that men ever enter into - shall be entirely void, or essentially impaired, or that the individuals entering into them shall be fined or imprisoned.

To an unsophisticated mind, nothing could be more self evident than the unconstitutionality of these laws. Yet they are enforced by the courts, and submitted to by the people, without their constitutionality being seriously questioned.

The Courts admit that the contracts, which are thus nullified or im- [*6] paired, would be obligatory, were it not that the law has deprived them of their obligation. But this is no answer to the objection, be­cause to impair their obligation is the very thing, which the law is forbidden to do. To say, therefore, that the law has deprived these contracts of their obligation, is equivalent to saying that a “law im­pairing the obligation of contracts” is constitutional. The very test of the constitutionality of the law, on this point, is, whether, if suffered to have its effect upon contracts, it would impair their obligation. If it would, it is unconstitutional, and, of course, void.

But let us now enquire, more particularly, what contracts are obliga­tory? or, rather, in what consists the obligation of contracts?

There have been differences of opinion on this point - but they have all arisen from a desire to uphold the arbitrary power that is assumed by legislatures over the subject. But for this, a doubt could never have arisen as to what constituted the obligation of a contract. The very phrase “obligation of contracts, “ implies that the obligation is some­thing intrinsic in the contracts themselves. It assumes that the ob­ligation is something that pertains to the contract naturally, and as a matter of course - and not that it is a quality contingent upon the will of those who had no hand in forming the contract. The facts, also, that the right of acquiring property by contract, is a natural right, and not one derived from municipal authority, and that the contracts enter­ed into by men in a state of nature, without reference to any municipal law, are obligatory, prove that the obligation of contracts must be some­thing intrinsic in the contracts themselves, depending upon the acts of the parties, and not upon any extraneous will.

What, then, is this intrinsic “obligation of contracts?“ It is, and it can be, nothing else than the requirements of natural justice, arising out of the acts of the parties. All judicial tribunals hold it to consist in this, and this alone - as is proved by the fact, that wherever this requirement is shown to exist, they hold the contract to be obligatory as matter of course, unless the legislature have specially ordered other­wise. And they will even imply a contract, in many cases, in order to enforce this requirement. On the other hand, where this requirement is shown not to have arisen out of the acts of the parties, the contract is held to be destitute of obligation. For instance, judicial tribunals hold that contracts entered into by persons that are mentally incompe­tent to make reasonable contracts, are not obligatory - that contracts entered into gratuitously, or without a valuable consideration, are not obligatory - that contracts obtained either by coercion or fraud, are not obligatory upon the party against whom the coercion or fraud has been practiced - that contracts to commit any vice, crime or immorality, or to pay for the commission of any vice, crime or immorality, or the ob­ject of which is to aid or encourage any vice, crime, or immorality, are of no obligation. All these contracts are destitute of obligation, and are held to be so by judicial tribunals, not because any [*8] legislative enactments have declared them void - (for, in general, there are no such enactments) - but, simply because natural justice does not require them to be fulfilled - or, what is the same thing, be­cause the contracts had no intrinsic obligation - no foundation in natu­ral justice. On the other hand, judicial tribunals, except where the legislature has ordered otherwise, hold all contracts to be obligatory, which justice and morality require to be fulfilled. Courts do not re­quire statute authority for enforcing each particular contract. The principles of natural justice are a sufficient authority, and in most cases their only authority. And this practice of course proceeds on the ground that the requirements of natural justice are what constitute the obliga­tion of contracts. And this practice shows also that the question of what contracts are obligatory, and what not, is a judicial, and not a legislative question.

The legislature, as a general rule, pass no laws declaring either what contracts shall, or what shall not, be obligatory. The judicial tribunals are established as much to decide what con­tracts are obligatory, as to enforce the fulfillment of them. Their authority to do this, is derived directly from the constitution, and not from the legislature. In general, the legislature do not seek to en­croach upon this prerogative of the judiciary-but leave it entirely to them to determine what contracts are, and what are not, obligatory. In fact, the judiciary do determine, and must determine, in the last resort, upon the obligation of every contract that is brought before them-for they must, of necessity, decide upon the obligation of all contracts, in regard to which the legislature have not spoken, and they must equally decide upon the obligation of those, in regard to which the legislature have spoken, because they must determine the validity of every legislative enactment, that assumes to interfere with, or control, the obli­gation of contracts.

The general principles, then, that obtain in regard to the obligation of contracts, are, 1st, that the obligation is intrinsic, arising solely from the acts of the parties, and that the requirements of natural justice con­stitute that obligation-and, second, that it is the province of the judic­iary to determine in what cases that obligation exists.

But although such are the general principles that obtain in all our ju­dicial tribunals, in regard to this particular point of the obligation and validity of contracts, the legislative department does nevertheless some­times assume the authority of innovating upon these general principles, and of dictating to the judiciary, how they shall decide in regard to the obligation of particular contracts. In the case of the contracts of un­licensed bankers, for instance, they enact that the judiciary, whenever these contracts come before them, shall decide that they have no obli­gation. This is the whole purport of the law that declares that these contracts shall be void. It is nothing more, nor less, than a require­ment upon the judiciary to deny their obligation-because the contracts are naturally obligatory, and the courts would of’ course hold them ob­- [*9] ligatory, if they were not required to do otherwise. And the legisla­ture make this requirement, not at all on the ground that these con­tracts really have no obligation - but they do it arbitrarily, and simply because it is their will that the judiciary should deny the existence of this obligation. They thus, in effect, require that the judiciary shall assert a falsehood - that they shall declare that a contract has no obli­gation, when it really has an obligation. By thus requiring the judici­ary to decide that a banker’s contract to pay money, has no obligation, they, in effect, require them to deny that he has received value for it- because, if he have received value for it, his obligation to pay has nec­essarily arisen, and that obligation has become an existing, unalterable fact-and however much the legislature may wish to have this fact de­nied, the fact itself still remains. The power of the legislature is as powerless to annul that fact, as it is to annul any other fact that has ever occurred. It is as powerless to annul that obligation, as it is to annul the parental, filial, or social obligations of mankind.

The question now is, whether any requirements, that may be made by the Legislature, upon the judiciary, to deny this fact, to deny this obligation, and to assert that no such fact or obligation exists, are binding upon the judiciary?

This question may probably be answered without going to the Con­stitution of the United States. The constitutions of most, if not all the states, contain, in some form or other, this provision, viz: that Courts shall be open, and that right and justice shall there be administered to every man without denial or delay. Now if the Legislature enact, that in adjudications upon bankers’ contracts, right and justice shall be vio­lated, withholden or denied, are not such enactments in palpable viola­tion of this provision of the constitution? And if the Legislature en­act that the obligation of bankers’ contracts shall be denied, disregard­ed, or not enforced, by the courts, is not that equivalent to a require­ment upon the courts that they shall withhold right and justice from the holders of those contracts? Clearly it is-and the requirement is consequently void even by the state constitutions.

But perhaps it will be said, that the Legislature does not assume to declare that right and justice shall be withholden, but only to declare what right and justice, under bankers’ contracts, shall be. The an­swer to this objection is, that right and justice, as accruing by con­tract, are judicial, and not legislative questions-and, therefore, if the legislature declare that right and justice, under certain contracts, shall be any thing different from what the judiciary would have decided them to be, they thereby virtually require the judiciary to violate or withhold right and justice. It is also an usurpation, on the part of the legislature, to prescribe what right and justice shall be, or to declare what rights accrue, under any contracts whatever. It is the business of the legislature to provide and prescribe the means, the instrumental­ities, to be used, for enforcing the right and the justice, that may ac­- [*10] crue to individuals, by virtue of their contracts - but it is the sole pre­rogative of the judiciary to determine what that right and that justice are. The legislature can prescribe, to the judicial tribunals, nothing that is of the essence of justice itself. If the legislature may prescribe to the judiciary what right and justice shall be, under one class of contracts, they may, by the same rule, prescribe what they shall be under all contracts whatsoever, and thus wholly usurp this prerogative of the judiciary. They may, in fact, make the judiciary a mere supple instrument in their hands.

But, perhaps it will be said, that the legislature do not merely require that bankers’ contracts shall be held void, but that they also forbid men to enter into those contracts - and that, inasmuch as the contracts them­selves are forbidden, no obligation or rights can arise out of them. The answer to this, is, that the legislature has no authority to pass laws forbidding amen to enter into obligatory contracts - and that all laws of that kind are unconstitutional, as conflicting with the constitutional right to acquire property. The natural right of men to acquire prop­erty of each other, being guarantied to them by the constitution, against the action of the legislature, the right to enter into obligatory contracts is necessarily guarantied also-because it is the only means by which they can acquire it.

It follows, then, that the people are secured, by the state constitu­tions generally, in the possession of these two rights, viz: to enter in­to all contracts with each other, that are in their nature obligatory - and, secondly, to have right and justice administered upon those con­tracts by the judiciary.

If these views are correct, we need go no farther than the State constitutions, to determine the validity of’ all those laws, or pretended laws by which the business of private banking is attempted to be pre­vented. These laws are palpably unconstitutional -and no mist of words, no professional quibbles, no arguments of expediency, no au­thority of long continued custom or acquiescence can conceal or resist the fact.

But let us now inquire whether these laws are not also in violation of the constitution of the United States.

This constitution declares that “No State shall pass any law impair­ing the obligation of contracts.”

What is “the obligation,” which is here assumed to pertain to con­tracts, and is forbidden to be impaired?

We have already seen that the intrinsic obligation of contracts - the obligation that is recognized by all judicial tribunals - is the require­ment of natural justice, arising out of certain acts of individuals. For instance, A sells to B a bushel of grain, and B promises that he will pay a reasonable compensation for it. Natural justice requires that he should make this payment - and this requirement of justice consti­tutes the obligation of this contract. And this requirement of natural [*10] justice is the kind of obligation, and the only kind, that is recognized and enforced by judicial tribunals. And it is recognized and enforced by them in all cases where it is shown to exist, except where legisla­tures specially interfere to set it aside. Is not this “the obligation,” which the constitution of the United States declares shall not be im­paired? If any say that it is not, it is incumbent upon them to show what other kind of obligation is meant. No other obligation pertains intrin­sically to contracts. No other is known to judicial tribunals-no other is known to the consciences of men. This obligation, it is true, is not always enforced in full-sometimes not even at all-but that is owing, as we say, to the authority allowed to unconstitutional laws. But no other obligation is ever enforced. No other obligation is even known. This, then, is “the obligation,” which the constitution declares shall not be impaired.

A prospective law may impair this obligation, as well as a retrospec­tive one. There is, in this respect, no difference between them. The prohibition of the constitution is against “any law” - whether prospec­tive or retrospective - that should impair the obligation of contracts.

The laws which declare that the contracts of unlicensed bankers, to pay money, shall be void, are palpable violations oh this clause of the constitution. And this position is so self-evidently correct, that I need spend no words in making it more clear. I will merely reply to the fictions and quibbles that are usually urged against it.

1st. It is said that if contracts are forbidden by law, they can have no obligation.

This ground is untenable for the following reasons. First - It as­sumes that the law is constitutional, and that the Legislature has au­thority to forbid men to enter into contracts that are in their nature obligatory-whereas this authority, as we have seen, is withholden from the legislature, even by the State constitutions-inasmuch 158 it would be in conflict with the constitutional right of the people to ac­quire property. If the legislature may forbid men to enter into one kind of obligatory contracts, they may, by the same rule, forbid them to enter into any-and the natural rights of men to buy, sell, contract, and exchange property, with each other, instead of being secured by the constitution, would become mere privileges to be withheld or permitted at the caprice or discretion of the Legislature. And if a banker’s con­tracts, for the purchase, sale, or delivery of money, are forbidden to­day, a farmer’s, merchant’s, and mechanic’s, for the purchase, sale, and [*11] delivery of their respective commodities, or appropriate articles of traffic, may be forbidden tomorrow.

2d. The State laws forbidding contracts that are in their nature obligatory, conflict also with the constitution of the United States-be­cause the provision against impairing the obligation of contracts, im­plies that men have a constitutional right to enter into all contracts that have an obligation. And all laws that forbid men to exercise their constitutional rights, are of course void.

3d.